




This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms
for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party
who does not participate in the primary market and inter-bidder resale, where the winner resells
to the losers.
To inﬂuence the resale outcome, the monopolist must design an allocation rule and a disclosure
policy that optimally fashion the beliefs of the participants in the secondary market. Our results
show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism may require a stochastic selling procedure and a
disclosure policy richer than the simple announcement of the decision to trade.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Durable goods are typically traded in both primary and secondary markets. Indeed, auctions for
real estate, artwork and antiques are often followed by resale. The same is true for licenses, patents,
Treasury bills, emission and spectrum rights. Similarly, IPOs and privatizations generate ownership
structures which change over time as a consequence of active trading in secondary markets.
Resale may have diﬀerent explanations. It may be a consequence of the fact that not all potential
buyers participate in the primary market.1 This can occur when a buyer values a good only if it is
ﬁrst sold to another buyer, such as in the case of an intermediate product that needs to be processed
b e f o r ei tc a nb eu s e db yaﬁnal user.2 Alternatively, participation only in secondary markets may
be due to a change in the environment: At the time the government decides to sell spectrum rights,
a company may not participate in the auction because it does not formally exist yet or because
it attaches a low value to the rights. After a merger, a privatization, or a successful takeover, the
company may develop interest in purchasing the rights and decide to buy them from the winner in
the primary market.3 Lastly, there can be legal or political impediments that prevent a monopolist
from contracting with certain buyers, such as in the case of an auction in which the government is
constrained to sell only to domestic ﬁrms.4
Resale may also be the result of misallocations in the primary market. As shown ﬁrst in Myerson
(1981), optimal auctions are typically ineﬃcient when the distributions of the bidders’ valuations
are asymmetric. By committing to a policy that places the good in the hands of a buyer who
does not value it the most, a seller can induce more aggressive bidding and raise a higher expected
revenue. When resale can not be prohibited, bidders may thus attempt to correct misallocations
in the auction by further trading in a secondary market.5
This paper considers the design of optimal mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers
to resell.6 We analyze a simple game of incomplete information where a monopolist sells a durable
good to a primary buyer who then resells in a secondary market. Trade in the resale game is the
result of an ultimatum bargaining procedure in which players make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers with
a probability distribution that reﬂects their relative bargaining abilities. Although stylized, the
model illustrates the dependence of the resale surplus on the information disclosed in the primary
market and is suﬃciently tractable to allow for a complete characterization of the optimal allocation
rule and disclosure policy from the monopolist’s viewpoint.
The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e rc o n s i d e r st h ec a s ew h e re resale is to a third party who does not
participate in the primary market. We show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism has some
interesting features.
First, the monopolist may ﬁnd it optimal to adopt a stochastic selling procedure, for example,
using lotteries and/or inducing the buyer to randomize over diﬀerent contract oﬀers. By selling
1Bikhchandani and Huang (1989), Haile (1999), and Milgrom (1987) consider auctions followed by resale where
the set of bidders in the primary market does not include all potential buyers.
2In this case, the monopolist is likely to lack the necessary bargaining power to extract money from the third
party without selling anything to her, as indicated in Milgrom (1987).
3Haile (2003) and Schwarz and Sonin (2001) consider models where bidders’ valuations change over time.
4Although not considered in this paper, participation only in secondary market sm a ya l s ob es t r a t e g i c ,a si n d i c a t e d
in McMillan (1994) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996).
5See also Gupta and Lebrun (1999) for an analysis of ﬁrst-price asymmetric sealed bid auctions followed by resale,
where trade in the secondary market is motivated by the ineﬃciency of the allocation in the primary market.
6Revenue-maximizing mechanisms without resale have been examined, among others, by Maskin and Riley (1984)
and Myerson (1981).with diﬀerent probability to diﬀerent types, the monopolist uses the decision to trade to signal
the buyer’s valuation to the third party so as to induce her to oﬀer a higher price. Contrary to
deterministic mechanisms, stochastic selling procedures permit the monopolist to change the beliefs
of the participants in the secondary market without excluding those buyers with a lower willingness
to pay. To illustrate, suppose the buyer has either a high or low valuation and assume the third
party’s prior beliefs are unfavorable to the buyer, in the sense that she is expected to oﬀer a low
price in the event she learns nothing from the outcome in the primary market. If the monopolist
uses a deterministic mechanism that sells to both types with certainty, the third party oﬀers a low
price. If, on the other hand, she sells only to the high type, the third party oﬀers a price equal
to the high valuation, but again this leaves no surplus to the buyer. In contrast, with a stochastic
mechanism, the monopolist can sell to the high type with certainty and to the low type with positive
but suﬃciently low probability to induce the third party to oﬀer a high resale price, increasing the
surplus the low type expects from resale and hence his willingness to pay in the primary market.
Second, the optimal mechanism may require the adoption of a disclosure policy richer than the
simple announcement of the decision to trade. In the example above, the monopolist could disclose
two signals, the ﬁrst one with a higher probability when the buyer reports a high valuation, the
second with a higher probability when he reports a low valuation. The advantage of disclosing
additional information stems from the possibility of increasing the level of trade with the low type.
In the limit, if the monopolist knew the buyer’s valuation, she could sell with certainty to both
types and use only a stochastic disclosure policy to control the beliefs of the third party in the
secondary market.
Things are more complicated when the buyer’s valuation is not known to the initial seller. In
this case, disclosure increases the level of trade but does not permit sale to both types with certainty,
since the combination of a certain allocation rule and a stochastic disclosure policy is not incentive
compatible. Indeed, if trade were certain, the high type would always select the contract with the
lowest price, irrespective of the associated disclosure policy. But then the low type would mimic
the high type, paying the same price and inducing the monopolist to disclose the most favorable
signal with a higher probability. The only way the monopolist can sort the buyer’s types and at
the same time disclose information to the third party is by making the high type pay a higher price
than the low type, which is possible only if a higher price is associated with a contract that delivers
the good with a higher probability.
We show how the optimal disclosure policy can be obtained as part of a direct mechanism in
which the monopolist sends recommendations to the third party about the price to oﬀer in the
resale game. We then discuss how these recommendations can be implemented by disclosing the
price the buyer pays in the primary market.
Finally, in the second part of the paper, we examine optimal auctions followed by inter-bidder
resale. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has been examined only by Ausubel and Cramton
(1999) and Zheng (2002). Ausubel and Cramton assume perfect resale markets and show that if
all gains from trade are exhausted through resale, then it is strictly optimal for the monopolist
to implement an eﬃcient allocation directly in the primary market. The case of perfect resale
markets is a benchmark, but abstracts from important elements of resale. First, when bidders trade
under asymmetric information, misallocations are not necessarily corrected in secondary markets
(Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)). Second, and more important, eﬃciency in the secondary
market is endogenous as it depends on the information revealed in the primary market which is
optimally fashioned by the monopolist through the choice of her allocation rule and disclosure
2policy.
Zheng assumes it is always the winner in the primary market who makes the oﬀer in the
secondary market and suggests a mechanism that, under certain conditions on the distributions
of the bidders’ valuations, gives the monopolist the same expected revenue as a standard optimal
auction where resale is prohibited. Instead of selling to the bidder with the highest virtual valuation,
the monopolist sells to the bidder who is most likely to implement in the secondary market the
same allocation as in a Myerson (1981) optimal auction .
This result however relies on the possibility of perfectly controlling the distribution of bargaining
power in the secondary market through the allocation of the good in the primary market. However,
that the original seller has the power to design the initial selling mechanism rarely implies that
any future seller of the same good will also have the power to determine the resale outcome. In
general, the distribution of bargaining power depends on the allocation of the good, but also on
the individual characteristics of the players, such as their personal bargaining abilities. When this
is the case, not only is it generically impossible to achieve Myerson’s expected revenue, it may also
be impossible to maximize revenue with a deterministic selling procedure.
Equilibria in English, ﬁrst-price, and second-price sealed bid auctions followed by resale have
been analyzed also by Haile (1999, 2003). His results illustrate how the option to resell creates
endogenous valuations and induces signaling incentives that may reverse the revenue ranking ob-
tained by assuming no resale. Our analysis builds on some of his insights, but diﬀers from his in
that we do not restrict the monopolist to use any speciﬁc format. Furthermore, the focus is on the
design of the optimal informational linkage between primary and secondary markets and on the
possibility of implementing it through the adoption of an appropriate disclosure policy.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines resale to third parties. Section
3 extends the analysis to markets where the monopolist can contract with all potential buyers but
can not prohibit the winner from reselling to the losers. Section 4 concludes.
2R e s a l e t o t h i r d p a r t i e s
Model set-up
Consider an environment where in the primary market a monopolistic seller, S, trades a durable
good with a (representative) buyer, B.I fB receives the good, he can either keep it for himself, or
resell it to a (representative) third party, T, who participates only in the secondary market.8
We use x ∈ {0,1} to denote the decision of whether to trade in the primary market. When
x =1 , B obtains the good from S,w h e r e a sw h e nx =0 ,Sretains the good. Similarly, xr =1
when in the resale market B sells to T and xr =0otherwise. An allocation in the primary market
(x,t) ∈ {0,1}×R consists of the decision to trade along with a monetary transfer t ∈ R from B to
S. Similarly, a resale outcome (xr,t r) consists of the decision to trade along with a transfer tr ∈ R
from T to B.
7Another strand of the literature related to this paper considers bidding in auctions followed by aftermarket
interactions. The seminal work is Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000). See also Goeree (2003) and Das Varma (2003).
Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2002) and Zhong (2002) examine the eﬀect of diﬀerent bid announcement policies on
revenue in standard auctions followed by Bertrand and Cournot competition.
8We adopt the convention of using masculine pronouns for B and feminine pronouns for S and T.
3All players are assumed to have quasi-linear preferences, uS = t, uB = θBx(1 − xr) − t + tr,
and uT = θTxxr − tr, where θi denotes the value i ∈ {B,T} attaches to the good. The valuations
(θB,θT) satisfy the following conditions:
A1: For i ∈ {B,T}, Θi =
©¯ θi,θi
ª
with ∆θi := ¯ θi − θi ≥ 0, θi > 0, and Pr(¯ θi)=pi.
A2: For any (θB,θT) ∈ ΘB × ΘT, Pr(θB,θT)=P r ( θB) · Pr(θT).
A3: B is the only player who knows θB and T is the only player who knows θT.
A4: θB ≤ θT ≤ ¯ θB ≤ ¯ θT.9,10
Secondary Market. The resale outcome is assumed to be the result of a random ultimatum
bargaining game: With probability λB, B makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to T, whereas with the
complementary probability λT =1− λB, T makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to B.W e r e s t r i c t
these oﬀers to simple prices tr ∈ R. From the perspective of B and T, simple prices are clearly
optimal. What is more, as discussed in the online Appendix, S does not gain by recommending
more complex resale mechanisms to B and T.
Primary Market. In this section we assume that S cannot sell to T, nor can she elicit any
information or extract any money from T.11 We also assume that S cannot contract directly upon
the actions of B and T in the resale game (i.e. their price oﬀers and acceptance decisions), nor can
she design the resale game, for example by assigning bargaining power to one of the two players.
If this were the case, S could also control the ﬁnal allocation and the analysis of the constraints
imposed by resale would be uninteresting.
S can however inﬂuence the behavior of T in the resale game through the design of her allocation
rule and by disclosing information about the buyer’s valuation. Formally, S oﬀers B a mechanism
ψ : M → R×4({0,1}×Σ) such that, when B reports a message m ∈ M, he pays an expected
transfer t(m) ∈ R and with probability ψ(σ|m): =P r ( x =1 , ˜ σ = σ|m) trade occurs and some
information σ ∈ Σ is disclosed to T.12 Any information ˜ σ ultimately results in a price oﬀer from T.
Following Myerson (1982), we can thus replicate the outcome induced by any indirect mechanism
(ψ,M,Σ) through a direct mechanism φ : ΘB → R×4({0,1}×Z) in which B must report his type
to S a n dt h e nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yφ(z|θB) trade occurs and a recommendation z =( tr(¯ θT),t r(θT)) ∈
Z = R2 is sent to T about the price to oﬀer in the resale game as a function of θT.13,14 Note that
9For brevity, we limit attention here to the case of overlapping supports (assumption A4). The results for the
case θB ≤ ¯ θB ≤ θT ≤ ¯ θT are very similar. In all other cases, the characterization of the optimal mechanism is
less interesting since the resale outcome does not depend on the beliefs that B or T have about the other player’s
valuation.
10Assuming ΘB and ΘT are binary sets permits to derive the optimal mechanism through linear programming.
As discussed in the concluding section, extending the analysis to continuous distributions poses nontrivial technical
problems.
11These assumptions are relaxed in Section 3.
12Since all players have quasi-linear preferences, restricting attention to mechanisms ψ : M → R ×4 ({0,1}×Σ)
instead of mechanisms ψ : M → 4(R×{0,1}×Σ) is without loss. Indeed, t(m) can always be read as the expected
transfer from B to S.
13Equivalently, to allow for recommendations for T that are type-dependent, we could have set ΘB × ΘT as the
domain of φ,l e tZ = R, and imposed restrictions on the mapping φ : ΘB × ΘT → R × ∆({0,1}×R) to capture the
impossibility for S to condition the terms of trade with B on T’s private information. However, given the restriction
that S cannot elicit information from T, we ﬁnd our notation more intuitive.
14A l s on o t et h a tt h e r ei sn on e e dt os p e c i f yar e c o m m e n d a t i o nf o rB, since there is no information about θT that S
can send to B. Similarly, there is no need to send acceptance recommendations to B and T, for the only sequentially
rational recommendations are to accept any oﬀer that is higher than θB (for the buyer) and below θT (for the third
party).
4since these recommendations are sent with a probability that depends on θB, they are also signals
of the buyer’s valuation. Furthermore, since recommendations will ultimately be implemented by
disclosing some information to T, in what follows, we will refer to the mapping d : ΘB → ∆(Z)
induced by φ both as a recommendation, or equivalently, as a disclosure policy.W ew i l lt h e ns a y
that the mechanism φ discloses information when it assigns positive measure to more than one
signal/recommendation.15
Timing.
• At τ =1 ,Spublicly announces her mechanism φ.I f B refuses to participate, the game
ends and all players get their reservation payoﬀs which are equal to zero.16 If B accepts, he
reports θB, pays an expected transfer t(θB) a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yφ(z|θB) receives the good
and a recommendation z ∈ Z is sent to T. Although T can observe φ, she does not observe
the announcement θB,n o rt h et r a n s f e rt.17
• At τ =2 , if x =1 , bargaining between B and T takes place according to the simple procedure
described above. Otherwise, the game is over.
Revenue-maximizing mechanism
We ﬁrst examine how the outcome in the secondary market is inﬂuenced by the mechanism
adopted in the primary market. Next, we derive the monopolist’s optimal mechanism.
The resale outcome.
First, consider the price tr(θT) oﬀered by T. Given the mechanism φ, a recommendation z =
(tr(¯ θT),t r(θT)) is incentive-compatible if T ﬁnds it optimal to obey to the recommendation instead
of oﬀering a diﬀerent price. Let
Pr(¯ θB|z): =
φ(z|¯ θB)pB
φ(z|¯ θB)pB + φ(z|θB)(1 − pB)
denote T’s posterior beliefs about the value B attaches to the good, given the mechanism φ and the
recommendation z ∈ Z. Since the supports ΘB and ΘT overlap, a recommendation z is incentive-
compatible if and only if tr(¯ θT) ∈ ΘB and tr(θT)=θB whenever Pr(¯ θB|z) < 1.18 We can thus
simplify the notation and describe a recommendation simply by the price that S recommends to ¯ θT.
15We are assuming that S can commit to any mechanism of her choosing. Without commitment, S can still fashion
the informational linkage with the secondary market, but this has to be done entirely through a stochastic allocation
rule, as discussed in the online Appendix.
16One could assume the distribution of bargaining power in the primary market to be also stochastic so that with
probability λS,Sdesigns the mechanism, whereas with the complementary probability, it is B. Our analysis starts
from the point where nature selects S. We thank the editor for suggesting this interpretation.
17Whether T can observe x is irrelevant, since she always makes her oﬀer contingent on the event that x =1 .
Indeed, trade between B and T is possible only if B received the good from S in the primary market. In what
follows, we thus consider the decision to trade as the the minimal information disclosed by S.
18When Pr(¯ θB|z)=1 , any t
r(θT) < ¯ θB is incentive-compatible.
5We use ¯ z and z to denote the recommendations to oﬀer tr(¯ θT)=¯ θB and tr(¯ θT)=θB, respectively.
To be incentive-compatible, ¯ z and z, must satisfy the following constraints
Pr(¯ θB|¯ z) ≥ ∆θB/[¯ θT − θB] (1)
Pr(¯ θB|z) ≤ ∆θB/[¯ θT − θB] (2)
Next, consider the price tr(θB) asked by B. Clearly, tr(¯ θB)=¯ θT, whereas tr(θB)=¯ θT if
pT ≥ [θT − θB]/[¯ θT − θB] and tr(θB)=θT otherwise.19
Denoting by r(θB|z) and s(θB) the surplus B expects from resale, respectively when it is T
and B who makes the oﬀer in the resale game, we have that ∆s := [s(¯ θB) − s(θB)] ≤ 0 and
∆r(z): =[ r(¯ θB|z)−r(θB|z)] ≤ 0 for any z ∈ {¯ z,z}. Resale not only increases the value B attaches
to the good from θB to θB + λBsB (θB)+λTrB(θB|z), but since it is more valuable for a low-
valuation buyer than a high-valuation one, it also reduces the diﬀerences between types. As we
show next, this aﬀects the monopolist’s ability to extract surplus as well as the structure of the
optimal mechanism.
Optimal mechanism.
Taking into account how T’s posterior beliefs depend on the mechanism adopted in the primary
market and letting J := [pB(¯ θT −¯ θB)]/[(1−pB)∆θB], the monopolist’s problem consists in choosing
a mechanism φ∗ that solves the following (linear) program
PS :
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨










φ(z|ˆ θB){θB+λBs(θB)+λTr(θB|z)}−t(ˆ θB), ∀(θB,ˆ θB) ∈ Θ2
B IC(θB)










φ(z|θB) ≥ 0 for any θB ∈ ΘB and z ∈ Z, with
P
z∈{z,¯ z}
φ(z|θB) ≤ 1( F)
The constraints IR(θB) and IC(θB) are resale-augmented incentive-compatibility and participation
constraints and guarantee that B ﬁnds it optimal to participate and reveal his type. The incentive-
compatibility constraints IC(¯ z) and IC(z) are obtained from (1) and (2) and guarantee that T
ﬁnds it optimal to follow S’s recommendations. Finally, (F) are standard feasibility constraints
that guarantee that all probabilities are well deﬁned.
Now, let
V (θB|z): =θB −
pB





19Assuming ¯ θB asks t
r(¯ θB)=¯ θT when he believes with probability one that θT = θT and that θB asks t
r(θB)=¯ θT
when indiﬀerent between t
r(θB)=¯ θT and t
r(θB)=¯ θT h a sn oe ﬀect on any of the results.
6K := [J(∆θB + λB∆s)]/[J(∆θB + λB∆s)+( 1− J)λTpT∆θB]
and consider the following two parameters’ regions
R1 : J<1 and either V (θB|z) ≤ 0 <V(θB|¯ z),o rV (θB|z) ∈ (0,K V(θB|¯ z)) and K = J;
R2 : V (θB|z) ∈ (0,K V(θB|¯ z)) and K ∈ (J,1).
Proposition 1 (Optimal mechanism) (i) Suppose R1 holds. Then, the monopolist sells with proba-
bility less than one to the low type and always recommends ¯ z: φ∗ ¡
¯ z|¯ θB
¢
=1 ,φ ∗ (¯ z|θB)=J and
φ∗ (0|θB)=1− J.
(ii) When instead R2 holds, the monopolist sells with probability less than one to the low
type and recommends both ¯ z and z with positive probability: φ∗ ¡
¯ z|¯ θB
¢
=1 ,φ ∗ (¯ z|θB)=J,
φ∗ (z|θB)=1− J/K, and φ∗ (0|θB)=J/K − J.
In all other cases, the monopolist sends only one recommendation and either sells to both types
with certainty, or excludes completely the low type.
Proof. Using the expressions for U(¯ θB) and U(θB), the constraints IC(¯ θB) and IC(θB) in PS












[∆θB + λB∆s + λT∆r(z)]
As it is standard, at the optimum, IR(θB) and IC(¯ θB) necessarily bind, since otherwise S could




φ∗ (z|θB)[∆θB + λB∆s + λT∆r(z)].
Furthermore, since ∆θB + λB∆s + λT∆r(z) ≥ 0 for any z ∈ {z, ¯ z}, when IC(¯ θB) and IR(θB) are
satisﬁed, so is IR(¯ θB).20 Substituting t(θB) and t(¯ θB) from IR(θB) and IC(¯ θB) into PS, and using
∆r(¯ z)=−pT∆θB, ∆r(z)=0and (3), the problem of the monopolist reduces to the choice of a
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z∈{z,¯ z} V (θB|z)φ(z|θB)]












z∈{z,¯ z} φ(z|θB)[∆θB + λB∆s]+φ(¯ z|θB)λTpT∆θB IC(θB)
Note that V (θB|z) are the standard Myerson (1981) virtual valuations — M(θB): =θB −
pB
1−pB∆θB
— augmented by the resale surplus λBs(θB)+λTr(θB|z) discounted by the eﬀect of resale on
20Note that r(θB|¯ z)=pT∆θB,r (θB|z)=0 , and r(¯ θB|z)=0for any z ∈ {z, ¯ z}, implying that ∆r(z) ∈
{−pT∆θB,0}. Similarly, s(θB)=pT(¯ θT − θB) and s(θB)=pT(¯ θT − θB) if t
r(θB)=θT and s(θB)=θT − θB
if t
r(θB)=θT,s ot h a t∆s ∈ (−∆θB,−pT∆θB].
7the informational rent for the high type. We proceed ignoring IC(z) since it never binds at the
optimum.
Favorable beliefs. When J ≥ 1, ¯ θT oﬀers a high price in the event she learns nothing from the
outcome in the primary market. This is clearly the most favorable case for the monopolist. Since





Unfavorable beliefs (J<1). When V (θB|¯ z) ≤ 0, the rent S must leave to ¯ θB when she sells to




Next, assume V (θB|¯ z) > 0. The solution then depends on the value of V (θB|z). When V (θB|z) ≤ 0,
it is clearly optimal to set φ∗(z|θB)=0in which case the optimal mechanism is the one described














. Indeed, US is increasing
in φ(z|¯ θB) and a larger φ(z|¯ θB) also helps relaxing IC(θB) and hence permits the monopolist to
increase φ(¯ z|θB). At the optimum, constraint IC(¯ z) must also bind. If not, S could increase
φ(¯ z|θB), possibly reducing φ(z|θB), relaxing IC(θB) and enhancing US. Combining IC(¯ z) and




.N o t et h a t




=1− φ(¯ z|θB). The monopolist thus faces a trade-oﬀ
between selling with certainty to both types, inducing T to oﬀer a low resale price (i.e. setting
φ(z|θB)=φ(z|¯ θB)=1 ), or sustaining a higher resale price but at the cost of not being able to sell




= φ(¯ z|θB)=J and φ(z|θB)=1−J/K).
When V (θB|z) ≥ KV (θB|¯ z),Sﬁnds it optimal to favor trade over a higher resale price and at
the optimum φ∗ (z|θB)=1for any θB. When instead V (θB|z) ∈ (0,K V(θB|¯ z)),t h eo p t i m a l
mechanism is either the one in (ii) if K>J ,or that in (i) if K = J,t h a ti si fpT =1 . Q.E.D.
The following is then a direct implication of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 (Suboptimality of deterministic allocations and trivial disclosure policies) In the pres-
ence of resale, a monopolist may need to adopt a stochastic selling procedure and a disclosure policy
richer than the simple announcement of the decision to trade.
It is well known that when a seller faces a single buyer, the optimal selling mechanism consists
in setting a ﬁxed price. The resale market makes it possible for the initial seller to extract surplus
indirectly from the third party through the buyer. When T has some bargaining power (i.e. λT > 0),
the seller’s mechanism design problem thus involves two agents, not one. To induce T to oﬀer a
high resale price, S may then ﬁnd it optimal to randomize over the decision to trade with the low
type. This makes the decision to trade more indicative of the high-value buyer. It follows that the
classic ﬁxed price result may fail when there is a resale market. What is more, S may ﬁnd it optimal
to disclose information in addition to the decision to trade. The advantage of a richer disclosure
policy stems from the possibility of increasing the level of trade with the low type without aﬀecting
the probability T oﬀers a high resale price.
With quasi-linear preferences, this additional information can simply be the price paid in the
primary market. For example, S could oﬀer a menu of two contracts: the ﬁrst one is such that
21Note that if S were constrained to use a deterministic selling procedure, the maximal revenue would be pB[¯ θB +
λBs(θB)] since V (θB|z) < 0 implies that S prefers to exclude θB r a t h e rt h a nl e a v i n gar e n tt ot h eh i g ht y p e . I n
contrast, with a stochastic procedure she can obtain U
∗
S = pB[¯ θB + λBs(θB)] + (1 − pB)JV(θB|z).
8the good is delivered with certainty at a price tH = t∗(¯ θB), the second with probability δ =
[1 − J/K]/[1 − J] at a price tL =[ t∗(θB) − Jt∗(¯ θB)]/[1 − J],w h e r et∗(θB) and t∗(¯ θB) are the
optimal transfers in the direct mechanism of Proposition 1. As we show in the online appendix,
this menu is designed so as to induce the high type to pay tH and the low type to randomize choosing
tH with probability J and tL with probability 1 − J. Note that this particular implementation,
which combines lotteries with mixed strategies, has the property that S fully discloses to T all the
information she learns from the buyer. In general, however, it may be diﬃcult to rely on mixed
strategies to conceal some information. When this is the case, S can still implement the optimal
mechanism using the price to signal the buyer’s valuation, but she may need to conceal the choice
of the contract. The following is an example. S could oﬀer B a menu of two contracts. The ﬁrst
one delivers the good with certainty at a price tH. The second uses a lottery to determine both the
decision to trade and the price. The lottery is such that with probability J the buyer receives the
good and pays tH, with probability 1−J/K he receives the good and pays tL, and with probability
J/K − J, the monopolist retains the good and B pays nothing. The prices tH and tL serve the
same role as the recommendations ¯ z and z in the direct mechanism and solve tH = t∗(¯ θB) and
JtH +[1−J/K]tL = t∗(θB). In equilibrium, the high type chooses the ﬁrst contract, while the low
type the second. In this case, the choice of the contract is a perfect signal of the buyer’s valuation
and must not be disclosed. Finally, an alternative implementation which also uses prices as signals,
but does not require the latter to be stochastic, is such that S never discloses the price paid by
the high type, whereas she discloses the price paid by the low type with probability 1 − J/K. Not
disclosing the price then leads to the same outcome as sending the recommendation ¯ z,w h e r e a s
disclosing t∗(θB) is perfectly informative of the low type and plays the same role as sending the
recommendation z.
We conclude that
Corollary 2 (Price disclosures) When the direct mechanism of Proposition 1 can not be imple-
mented announcing only the decision to trade, it suﬃces to disclose the price to create the optimal
informational linkage with the secondary market.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of resale on revenue. This depends on whether the secondary buyer
is a third party, as in the current setting, or a bidder who did not win in the primary market. This
s e c o n dp o s s i b i l i t yi se x a m i n e di nS e c t i o n3 . I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w eb r i e ﬂy comment on the eﬀect of
resale to third parties in markets with possibly many buyers.22
The option to resell increases the value a buyer assigns to winning the good. Furthermore,
resale reduces the diﬀerence between high and low valuation types and hence the rents S must leave
to a buyer to induce truthful information revelation. It follows that the resale-augmented virtual
valuations are higher than the corresponding Myerson virtual valuations for auctions without resale.
Nevertheless, this alone does not imply that resale is revenue-enhancing. Indeed, the monopolist
may not be able to implement the same allocations as in the absence of resale (note that the simple
monotonicity condition for standard mechanisms does not guarantee that IC(θB) is satisﬁed when
bidders can resell). However, through a policy that discloses only the identity of the winner, the
monopolist can always implement exactly the same allocation rule as in a Myerson optimal auction
22The extension to multiple buyers that can resell only to a third party who does not participate in the primary
market leads to results similar to those examined here. This extension is considered in the online Appendix.
9without resale. Clearly, this policy need not be optimal, as discussed in Corollary 1, but it implies
that resale to third parties is always revenue-enhancing.
3I n t e r - b i d d e r r e s a l e
Next, we consider an environment where the monopolist can contract with both B and T, but
cannot prohibit inter-bidder resale. Bargaining in the resale game takes place according to the
same procedure as described in the previous section.
Let the identity of the winner be denoted by h ∈ {B,T}. A direct mechanism (with an embedded
recommendation/disclosure policy) is now a mapping φ : ΘT ×ΘB → R2×∆({B,T}×Z) such that
when B and T report θ =( θT,θB), they pay tB(θB) and tT(θT) a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yφ(i,z|θ): =
Pr(h = i,˜ z = z|θ) the good is assigned to bidder h ∈ {B,T} and recommendations z := (zB,z T) ∈
Z :=( ZB×ZT)=R2 a r es e n tt oB and T specifying the price to oﬀer/ask in the resale game.23 As
usual, these recommendations are private, in the sense that B observes only zB ∈ ZB and T only
zT ∈ ZT. Note that the monopolist can now inﬂuence not only the price oﬀered by a resale-buyer,
but also the price asked by a resale-seller. Furthermore, she can make a bidder pay for the surplus
he (or she) expects from resale even without trading with him (her). Finally, note that, as in the
previous section, S does not need to send acceptance recommendations.
Given a true type proﬁle θ,l e tsi(θ|h,tr) denote the surplus that player i ∈ {B,T} obtains in
the secondary market when he or she oﬀers (asks) tr and player h ∈ {B,T} is awarded the good in
the primary market. Similarly, ri(θ|h,tr) denotes the surplus for bidder i when j oﬀers (asks) tr
with j 6= i.


















[θiIh=i + λisi(θi,θj|h,tr(θi,ˆ θi,h,z i))
+λjri(θi,θj|h,zj)]φ(h,z|ˆ θi,θj)} − ti(ˆ θi) ∀(θi,ˆ θi) ∈ Θ2
i and ∀ tr : Θ2
i ×{ B,T}×Zi → R,
(5)
where Ih=i =1if h = i and zero otherwise. Following Myerson (1982), (5) controls for two types of
incentives. It guarantees that, conditional on reporting θi truthfully to S, in the resale game bidder
i prefers to obey to the monopolist’s recommendation and oﬀer (ask) tr = zi rather than any other
price tr 6= zi. It also implies that revealing θi is sequentially rational. Note that the optimal resale
price tr(θi,ˆ θi,h,z i) is a function of bidder i’s true type θi, bidder i’s report in the primary market
ˆ θi, the identity of the winner h, and the recommendation zi.
23Since all players have quasi-linear preferences, we can restrict attention to mechanisms in which ti are deterministic
and depend only on θi,f o ri ∈ {B,T}. Formally, for any mechanism φ : ΘB × ΘT → ∆(R
2 ×{ B,T}×R
2), there
exists a mechanism φ : ΘB × ΘT → R
2 × ∆({B,T}×R
2) in which ti(θ)=ti(θi) for any θ ∈ ΘB × ΘT that is
payoﬀ-equivalent for all players.
10In what follows, instead of describing the solution to the above program for all possible param-
eter conﬁgurations, we ﬁnd it more interesting to discuss directly the eﬀect of inter-bidder resale
on the structure of the optimal allocation rule.24
Proposition 2 (Inter-bidder resale) Suppose the monopolist cannot prohibit inter-bidder resale. Then,
it is generically impossible to maximize revenue with a deterministic selling procedure.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As in the case where resale is to a third party, the monopolist uses the identity of the winner to
signal the bidders’ valuations. However, a diﬀerence is that now the monopolist may ﬁnd it optimal
to inﬂuence beliefs both on and oﬀ the equilibrium path. Suppose, for example, that λT =1and
J<1, in which case ¯ θT is expected to oﬀer a low price in the event she loses the auction without
learning any information about θB. By inducing ¯ θT to oﬀer tr = ¯ θB instead of tr = θB out of
equilibrium, that is, after announcing θT = θT, the monopolist can reduce the informational rent
she must leave to ¯ θT and extract more revenue. For example, S could sell to B when the two bidders
report (θT,¯ θB) and to T when they report (θT,θB), so that losing the auction when announcing
θT = θT becomes a perfect signal of B having a high valuation. However, when selling to T in
state θ =( θT,θB) is dominated (in terms of rents for both bidders) by selling to B, the monopolist
can do better by assigning the good to B with probability J and to T with the complementary
probability.25 Once again, the advantage of stochastic procedures stems from the possibility of
manipulating beliefs (on and oﬀ equilibrium) and at the same time implementing more proﬁtable
allocations.
Note that when both bidders are expected to inﬂuence the resale price, it is also generically
impossible to create the desired informational linkage with the secondary market disclosing only
the identity of the winner. In fact, even if a certain allocation rule induces the right beliefs for one
bidder, it typically fails to induce the desired beliefs for the other. When this is the case, S may
gain by disclosing more information, such as the winning price, or more generally a statistic of the
bids submitted in the auction.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of resale on revenue. Clearly, when the monopolist can contract with
all potential buyers, the revenue in any auction followed by resale is never higher than in a Myerson
optimal auction where resale is prohibited. The latter is a mechanism that assigns the good to
the bidder with the highest virtual valuation M(θi), provided that maxi∈B,T {M(θi)} ≥ us =0 ,
where M(¯ θi)=¯ θi and M(θi): =θi −
pB
1−pB∆θi. For example, when M(θB) > max{M(θT),0}, the
monopolist sells to T when the latter has a high valuation and to B otherwise with an expected
revenue equal to Eθ[max{M(θT),M(θB),0} = pT¯ θT +(1−pT)θB. Now, suppose S can not prohibit
resale, but can control the distribution of bargaining power in the secondary market through the
allocation of the good in the primary market. Precisely, suppose it is always the winner who sets
the price in the resale bargaining game (cfr Zheng, 2002). The impossibility of prohibiting resale
then does not hurt the monopolist. Indeed, S c a ns i m p l ys e l lt oB at a price pT¯ θT +(1−pT)θB and
use the latter as a middleman to extract surplus from T in the secondary market. Since in this case
B learns nothing about the value T attaches to the good, he asks a price tr(θB)=¯ θT independently
24Despite the fact that the program is linear and that ΘB and ΘT are binary sets, the number of controls and
constraints in the program for the optimal mechanism is signiﬁcantly high.
25Selling to B with probability higher than J would induce θT to reduce her oﬀer from t
r = θB to t
r = θB which,
as discussed above, is not optimal.
11of his type.26 Through resale, S thus implements the same ﬁnal allocation and obtains exactly the
same expected revenue as in a Myerson optimal auction.
When instead the distribution of bargaining power in the resale game is a function of the bidders’
personal characteristics, such as their bargaining abilities, and λT > 0, any mechanism in which S
sells to B with positive probability must necessarily leave some rent to ¯ θT.T h i si m p l i e sal o s so f
revenue for the monopolist, as formally proved in the online Appendix.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
When buyers anticipate the possibility of resale, their willingness to pay incorporates the surplus
they expect from the secondary market. The outcome in the resale game is also endogenous as
it depends on the information disclosed in the primary market. Starting from these observations,
we have proposed a tractable model that illustrates the intricacies associated with the design of
optimal mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. The main insight is that
it may be impossible to maximize revenue with a deterministic selling procedure and a disclosure
policy that announces only the decision to trade. This result has been derived assuming ﬁnite
valuations (binary). Extending the analysis to continuous distributions represents an interesting
line for future research. The diﬃculty with the continuum stems from the fact that the program for
the optimal mechanism is no longer linear and from the fact that the set of incentive-compatible
price recommendations is often diﬃcult to characterize without imposing ad hoc restrictions. A
similar diﬃculty arises in the literature on dynamic contracting where a principal needs to control
the beliefs of his future selves; although a complete characterization is available in the two-type case
(Laﬀont and Tirole 1988, 1990), the generalization to the continuum poses nontrivial problems.
Finally, a last remark concerns the foundations for resale. In this paper, we have assumed
resale occurs as a result of (i) the impossibility of contracting with all potential buyers, and (ii)
the possibility that the bidders correct misallocations in the primary market by trading in the
secondary market. Allowing resale to be a consequence of changes in valuations is also likely to
deliver interesting insights for the design of optimal mechanisms.
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .Let
Zi(ˆ θi,h)={zi ∈ Zi : φ(h,zi,z j|ˆ θi,θj) > 0 for some (zj,θj) ∈ Zj × Θj}
denote the set of recommendations that S sends to bidder i when the latter reports ˆ θi and bidder
h ∈ {B,T} receives the good. For any zi ∈ Zi(ˆ θi,h), let Pr(θj|ˆ θi,h,z i) denote the posterior beliefs
of bidder i about θj when i announces ˆ θi in the primary market, bidder h is awarded the good
and i receives a recommendation zi ∈ Zi(ˆ θi,h), with i,j,h ∈ {B,T} and j 6= i. Finally, for any
(θi,ˆ θi) ∈ Θ2
i,h∈ {B,T} and zi ∈ Zi(ˆ θi,h), let
Tr(θi,ˆ θi,h,z i) = argmax
tr∈R
{Pr(¯ θj|ˆ θi,h,z i)si(θi,¯ θj|h,tr)+P r ( θj|ˆ θi,h,z i)si(θi,θj|h,tr)} (6)
denote the set of optimal resale prices for bidder i.
26Indeed, M(θT) ≤ M(θB) implies pT ≥ [θT − θB]/[¯ θT − θB].
12Using (6), the incentive-compatibility constraints (5) can be decomposed into the following
constraints






[θiIh=i + λisi(θi,θj|h,tr(θi,ˆ θi,h,z i))
+λjri(θi,θj|h,zj)]φ(h,z|ˆ θi,θj)} − ti(ˆ θi) for any θi and ˆ θi 6= θi,
with tr(θi,ˆ θi,h,z i) ∈ Tr(θi,ˆ θi,h,z i) for any (h,zi) ∈ {B,T}×Zi s.t. zi ∈ Zi(ˆ θi,h).
(8)
The constraints in (7) guarantee that, conditional on reporting θi truthfully in the primary market,
in the resale game bidder i prefers to follow the recommendation zi instead of oﬀering/asking a
price tr 6= zi. The constraints in (8) in turn guarantee that it is indeed optimal for i to report his
(her) type truthfully.




subject to (4), (7) and (8).
Following arguments similar to those in standard mechanism design, it is easy to verify that at
the optimum the individual-rationality constraint (4) must bind for θi and the incentive-compatibility
constraint (8) for ¯ θi,f o ri = B,T. This implies that the monopolist’s objective function can be











Vi(¯ θi,θj|h,z): = M(¯ θi)Ih=i + λisi(¯ θi,θj|h,zi)+λjri(¯ θi,θj|h,zj)







∆si(θj|h,zi): = si(¯ θi,θj|h,tr(¯ θi,θi,h,z i)) − si(θi,θj|h,zi)
∆ri(θj|h,zj): = ri(¯ θi,θj|h,zj) − ri(θi,θj|h,zj)
The monopolist’s problem thus consists in selecting a mechanism φ∗ that maximizes (9) subject to












[∆θiIh=i + λi(si(¯ θi,θj|h,zi) − si(θi,θj|h,tr(θi,¯ θi,h,z i)))
+λj∆ri(θj|h,zj)]φ(h,z|¯ θi,θj)}
with tr(θi,¯ θi,h,z i)) ∈ Tr(θi,¯ θi,h,z i) for any (h,zi) ∈ {B,T}×Zi s.t. zi ∈ Zi(¯ θi,h).
To prove the claim in Proposition 2, it suﬃces to consider the case λT =1 , J<1,M (θT) > 0
and pT >p B.27 In this case, S does not need to send any recommendation to B.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
27See the online Appendix for a complete characterization of the optimal mechanism.
13since θB ≤ θT ≤ ¯ θB ≤ ¯ θT, when h = T, the only incentive-compatible recommendation for ¯ θT
is to ask tr(¯ θT) ≥ ¯ θT and for θT to ask tr(θT)=¯ θB if Pr(¯ θB|·) > 0 and any tr ≥ θT otherwise.
Similarly, when h = B, the only incentive-compatible recommendation for θT is to oﬀer a price
tr(θT)=θB if Pr(θB|·) > 0 and any price tr(θT) ≤ θT otherwise. We will assume that θT always
asks tr(θT)=¯ θB when h = T and oﬀers tr(θT)=θB when h = B.28 Since these are the same prices
that T oﬀers in the absence of any explicit recommendation, to save on notation, we will drop z
from the mapping φ when h = T, or h = B and θT = θT. When instead h = B and θT = ¯ θT,w e
will denote by ¯ z and z the recommendations to oﬀer tr(¯ θT)=¯ θB and tr(¯ θT)=θB, respectively.
For these recommendations to be incentive compatible, the mechanism φ must satisfy
φ(B,z|¯ θT,θB) ≥ Jφ(B,z|¯ θT,¯ θB) (10)
φ(B,¯ z|¯ θT,θB) ≤ Jφ(B,¯ z|¯ θT,¯ θB) (11)
Next, let Φ1 denote the set of mechanisms such that ¯ θT ﬁnds it (weakly) optimal to oﬀer a high
resale price tr(¯ θT)=¯ θB oﬀ-equilibrium, that is, after reporting ˆ θT = θT in the primary market. A
mechanism φ ∈ Φ1 only if
φ(B|θT,θB) ≤ Jφ(B|θT,¯ θB). (12)
Letting Iφ∈Φ1 =1if φ ∈ Φ1 and zero otherwise, and substituting for the values of sT(·) and rB(·),
the problem for the monopolist reduces to the choice of a mechanism φ∗ that maximizes29
US = pTpB{¯ θTφ(T|¯ θT,¯ θB)+¯ θTφ(B,¯ z|¯ θT,¯ θB)+¯ θBφ(B,z|¯ θT,¯ θB)}
+pT (1 − pB){¯ θTφ(T|¯ θT,θB)+¯ θTφ(B,¯ z|¯ θT,θB)+( ¯ θT −
pB
1−pB∆θB)φ(B,z|¯ θT,θB)}
+(1− pT)pB{[¯ θB −
pT
1−pT
¡¯ θT − ¯ θB
¢






+[1 − Iφ∈Φ1](M(θT) −
pB
1−pB∆θB)φ(B|θT,θB)}














− φ(B|θT,θB)]≥ 0 (13)
pB
¡¯ θT − ¯ θB
¢
[φ(T|¯ θT,¯ θB)+φ(B,¯ z|¯ θT,¯ θB) − φ(T|θT,¯ θB) − Iφ∈Φ1φ(B|θT,¯ θB)]
+(1− pB)∆θT[φ(T|¯ θT,θB)+φ(B,z|¯ θT,θB) − φ(T|θT,θB) − [1 − Iφ∈Φ1]φ(B|θT,θB)]
+(1− pB)(∆θT − ∆θB)[φ(B,¯ z|¯ θT,θB) − Iφ∈Φ1φ(B|θT,θB)] ≥ 0.
(14)











, θ =(θT,θB) only through the
constraints (13) and (14). In the following, we ignore (13) and (14) since they do not bind at the
28Clearly, S does not have any incentive to recommend a diﬀerent price.
29Assuming that ¯ θT oﬀers a high price oﬀ-equilibrium when she is indiﬀerent between t
r = ¯ θB and t
r = θB is
without loss of generality. Indeed, when φ(B|θT,θ B)=Jφ(B|θT,¯ θB), both US and (14) are insensitive to whether
¯ θT oﬀe r sal o wo rah i g hr e s a l ep r i c e .
14optimum. This implies that the optimal mechanism can be obtained by ﬁrst choosing the controls
for the two states θ =( ¯ θT,¯ θB) and θ =( ¯ θT,θB) that maximize US under the constraints (10) and
(11) and then choosing the controls for the other two states θ =( θT,¯ θB) and θ =( θT,θB).







1. Next, consider the other two states θ =( θT,¯ θB) and θ =( θT,θB). Note that necessarily
φ∗ ∈ Φ1 since otherwise S could reduce φ(B|θT,θB) and increase φ(T|θT,θB) increasing US.F u r -
thermore, since M(θT) > 0 and pT >p B, at the optimum (12) must necessarily bind. Substi-
tuting φ(B|θT,θB)=Jφ(B|θT,¯ θB), we then have that US is strictly increasing in φ(B|θT,¯ θB).
We conclude that any optimal mechanism must satisfy φ∗(B|θT,¯ θB)=1 , φ∗(B|θT,θB)=J and
φ∗ (T|θT,θB)=1 −J, implying that the allocation rule is necessarily stochastic when θ =( θT,θB).30
Q.E.D.
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11 Restriction to price oﬀers in the resale ultimatum bargaining
game
In the model set up, we assume that in the resale ultimatum bargaining game B and T are re-
stricted to simple take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀers. In this appendix, we prove that, not only are price
oﬀers sequentially optimal for B and T, but S does not gain from recommending more complex
mechanisms.1 We ﬁrst characterize the allocations (for the primary and the secondary market)
that maximize the monopolist’s revenue under minimal sequential rationality constraints for B and
T and then show that these allocations can also be sustained in the game where oﬀers in the resale
bargaining game are restricted to simple prices.
For simplicity, assume λT =1and consider the case where resale is to a third party (the proof
for λT ∈ [0,1] and inter-bidder resale follows similar arguments).
Suppose that at τ =2 ,Tcan choose from a topological space of feasible resale mechanisms
Πr. A resale mechanism π =( Mr,α) ∈ Πr consists of a set of messages Mr for player B along
with a measurable mapping α : Mr → R×∆({0,1}) that assigns to each message mr ∈ Mr a
lottery over the decision to trade and an expected payment from T to B.L e t Υ denote the set
of resale mechanisms that consist of simple take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀers.2 Without confusion, an
element of Υ can be denoted simply by the price tr. Finally, let Ξ denote the set of direct resale
mechanisms ξ : ΘB 7→ R×∆({0,1}). Since any mechanism in Ξ has the same message space, to
save on notation, an element of Ξ will be denoted simply by the mapping ξ.
Now, consider the monopolist. Let Ψ represent a topological space of feasible mechanisms
for S. A mechanism ψ =( M,R,β) ∈ Ψ consists of a set of messages M for B, as e to fs i g -
nals/recommendations R that S can send to T and a measurable mapping β : M 7→ R×∆({0,1}×
R) that assigns to each message m ∈ M an expected transfer t(m) ∈ R from B to S and a joint
lottery δ(m) ∈ ∆({0,1}×R ) over the decision to trade and the recommendations R.N o w ,l e t˜ Φ
denote the set of direct mechanisms ˜ φ : ΘB 7→ R×∆({0,1}× ˜ Z) in which the recommendations
˜ z =( ξ(θT),ξ(θT)) ∈ ˜ Z = Ξ2 that S sends to T consists in a pair of direct resale mechanisms, respec-
tively for θT and θT. Finally, let Φ denote the set of direct mechanisms φ : ΘB 7→ R×∆({0,1}×Z)
in which S recommends simple take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀers z =( tr(θT),t r(θT)) ∈ Z = Υ2.I nt h e
following, we will denote by ˜ φ ∈ ˜ Φ an element of ˜ Φ and by φ ∈ Φ an element of Φ.
1This does not mean that a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game where B and T are randomly selected to design
the resale mechanism is the most favorable resale procedure from the perspective of the initial seller. For example,
in the case of inter-bidder resale, if S could choose the resale game, she could simply prohibit any future transaction
between B and T and then implement a Myerson optimal auction in the primary market. Alternatively, she could
dictate that it is always the resale-seller who makes the oﬀer in the secondary market (as discussed in the paper,
sometimes this also allows the monopolist to extract the Myerson revenue — see Zheng (2002)).
2Formally, a take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀer is a mechanism (M
r,α), with M
r = {yes,no},s u c ht h a t ,w h e nB
chooses the message m = yes, the good is transferred to T and B receives a payment t
r, whereas when he chooses
m = no, he keeps the good and receives no money from T.
2Now, let U∗
S represent the highest equilibrium payoﬀ for the monopolist in the restricted game
where Πr = Υ and Ψ = Φ, that is in the game where T can only make take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀers
and S c a no n l yo ﬀer direct mechanisms φ ∈ Φ, as assumed in the model set up. Similarly, let ˜ U∗
S
denote the highest equilibrium payoﬀ in an unrestricted game where Πr ⊇ Ξ ∪ Υ and Ψ ⊇ ˜ Φ ∪ Φ.
Claim A1. S does not gain from recommending that T and B oﬀer mechanisms in the
ultimatum bargaining game more complex than simple price oﬀers: ˜ U∗
S = U∗
S.
Proof. We prove the result in three steps. Step 1 shows that in the unrestricted game, ˜ U∗
S can
be sustained by an equilibrium where S oﬀers a mechanism ˜ φ
∗
∈ ˜ Φ and T follows the monopolist’s
recommendations. Step 2 characterizes the allocations induced by ˜ φ
∗
. Finally, step 3 shows that
these allocations can also be sustained by an equilibrium in the restricted game where Πr = Υ and
Ψ = Φ.
Step 1. Given any direct mechanism ˜ φ ∈ ˜ Φ, let ˜ Z(˜ φ) denote the set of recommendations
˜ z =( ξ(θT),ξ(θT)) in the support of ˜ φ and Ξ(˜ φ) the set of all direct resale mechanisms recommended
by ˜ φ.F o r m a l l y ,Ξ(˜ φ)={ξ ∈ Ξ : ∃ ˜ z =( ξ(θT),ξ(θT)) ∈ ˜ Z(˜ φ) s.t. ξ = ξ(θT) or ξ = ξ(θT)}.
Now, consider a mechanism ˜ φ
∗
with the following properties:
(i) B ﬁnds it optimal to participate and truthfully report his type in ˜ φ
∗
as well as in any resale
mechanism ξ ∈ Ξ(˜ φ
∗
);
(ii) given any ˜ z =( ξ(θT),ξ(θT)) ∈ ˜ Z(˜ φ
∗
), the direct mechanism ξ(θT) is optimal for θT —a n y
other mechanism ξ ∈ Ξ that is individually-rational and incentive-compatible for B l e a d st oal o w e r
payoﬀ for θT (formally, ξ(θT) is a solution to the program PT(r,θT) described below with r =˜ z).
(iii) ˜ φ
∗
is optimal for S —a n yo t h e r˜ φ that strictly dominates ˜ φ
∗
necessarily violates (i) or (ii).
In the sequel, we prove the following two results. First, for any mechanism ˜ φ
∗
that satisﬁes
(i)-(iii), there exists an equilibrium in the unrestricted game where Πr ⊇ Ξ ∪ Υ and Ψ ⊇ ˜ Φ ∪ Φ
that supports ˜ φ
∗
. That is, we can construct a (sequentially rational) strategy for B that speciﬁes
a complete plan of action for any pair of mechanisms (ψ,π) ∈ Ψ × Πr —t h a ti s ,ap a i ro ff u n c t i o n
σB : ΘB ×Ψ → ∆(M) and σB : ΘB ×Ψ×M×R ×{ 0,1}×R×Π → ∆(Mr) — and a (sequentially
rational) strategy for T that speciﬁes a reaction to any upstream mechanism ψ —t h a ti s ,af u n c t i o n
σ : ΘT × Ψ ×R→ ∆(Πr) — such that: (a) S ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀer ˜ φ
∗
;( b )T ﬁnds it optimal to
obey to the recommendations ˜ z ∈ ˜ Z(˜ φ
∗
);a n d( c )B ﬁnds it optimal to participate and truthfully
report his type in ˜ φ
∗
as well as in any resale mechanism ξ ∈ Ξ(˜ φ
∗
). Second, the monopolist’s payoﬀ
in the equilibrium supporting ˜ φ
∗
is higher than in any other equilibrium, i.e. it yields ˜ U∗
S.3
To prove these claims, take any equilibrium of the unrestricted game. Given any upstream
3As we show below, ˜ φ
∗
identiﬁe sap r o ﬁle of allocations — probabilities of trade and transfers for each state (θB,θ T)
— that maximize the monopolist’s payoﬀ under minimal sequential rationality constraints for B and T.
3mechanism ψ =( M,R,β) ∈ Ψ,l e t
R(σB): ={r ∈ R : ∃ m ∈ Supp[σB(θB,ψ)] s.t. r ∈ Supp[δ(m)] for some θB ∈ ΘB}
denote the set of recommendations that, given the buyer’s strategy at τ =1 , are sent with pos-
itive probability to T. For any recommendation r ∈ R(σB), the reaction σT(θT,ψ,r) ∈ ∆(Πr) is
sequentially rational for θT if and only if, given the buyer’s strategy at τ =2 ,i tl e a d st oap a i ro f
probability of trade {xr(θB),x r(θB)} ∈ [0,1]2 and a pair of expected transfers {tr(θB),t r(θB)} ∈ R2
— that solve the following program:4
PT(r,θT):
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






s.t. for any (θB,b θB) ∈ Θ2
B
tr (θB) − θBxr(θB) ≥ 0( IRB(θB))
tr (θB) − θBxr(θB) ≥ tr(b θB) − θBxr(b θB)( ICB(θB))
where Pr(θB|r;ψ) is computed using Bayes’ rule and the buyer’s strategy at τ =1 . I n d e e d ,i ft h e
allocations induced by σT(θT,ψ,r) do not solve PT(r,θT), then, θT has a proﬁtable deviation that
consists in oﬀering a direct mechanism ξ ∈ Ξ which solves the above program.5
We conclude that, given any pair of (sequentially rational) strategies σB and σT, an upstream
mechanism for the monopolist ψ =( M,R,β) ∈ Ψ (no matter whether it is on or oﬀ the equilibrium
path) ultimately leads to a mapping f : ΘB 7→ R×∆({0,1}×R) that assigns to each θB an expected
transfer t(θB) ∈ R from B to S and a joint lottery δ(θB) ∈ ∆({0,1}×R ), with the following
properties:
(A) type θB ∈ ΘB prefers the outcome f(θB)=( t(θB),δ(θB)) to the outcome f(ˆ θB)=
(t(ˆ θB),δ(ˆ θB)) that can be obtained by mimicking the behavior of type ˆ θB 6= θB.
(B) for any r ∈ R(σB), the allocations induced by the reaction of θT solve PT(r,θT).
Consider the following transformation of ψ =( M,R,β) into a direct mechanism ˜ φ ∈ ˜ Φ (using
σB and σT). For any ˜ z =( ξ(θT),ξ(θT)) ∈ ˜ Z = Ξ2,l e t ˜ R(˜ z) ⊆ R(σB) denote the set of recommenda-
tions that, given σB and σT, ultimately lead to the same allocations as those speciﬁed in the pair of
direct resale mechanisms (ξ(θT),ξ(θT)). Now, take a direct mechanism ˜ φ : ΘB 7→ R×∆({0,1}× ˜ Z)
that assigns to each θB ∈ ΘB the same expected transfer as ψ, and a lottery over {0,1}× ˜ Z such
4Note that, even if T faces an "informed principal" mechanism design problem, since both B and T have quasi-
linear preferences, private values and ﬁnite types, T never gains from hiding her private information to B —s e eM a s k i n
and Tirole (1990).
5To guarantee that, whenever indiﬀerent, B participates and truthfully reveals his type, T may need to increase
the transfers t
r(¯ θB) and t
r(θB),t h a ts o l v ePT(r, θT), respectively by ε and δ. However, with quasilinear payoﬀs, ε




r∈ ˜ R(˜ z)
ψ(r|θB)
where ψ(r|θB): =P r ( x =1 ,r0 = r|θB;ψ) and ˜ φ(˜ z|θB): =P r ( x =1 , ˜ z0 =˜ z|θB; ˜ φ). The mechanism
˜ φ constructed this way maps ΘB into the same ﬁnal outcomes — probability of trade and expected
payments — as the mechanism ψ. Furthermore, given ˜ φ, T has the correct incentives to follow the
monopolist’s recommendations. To see this, note that when the supports ΘB and ΘT overlap, a
recommendation ˜ z =( ξ(θT),ξ(θT)) ∈ ˜ Z(˜ φ), is incentive-compatible if and only if ξ(θT) is such that
xr(θB)=1 ,x r(θB)=0 ,t r(θB)=θB,t r(θB)=0 , (SR(˜ z,θT))





1 if Pr(θB|˜ z) > ∆θB/[θT − θB]
0 if Pr(θB|˜ z) < ∆θB/[θT − θB]
any η ∈ [0,1] if Pr(θB|˜ z)=∆θB/[θT − θB]
tr(θB)=xr(θB)θB; tr(θB)=θB + xr(θB)∆θB
(SR(˜ z,θT))
Hence, recommendations may diﬀer only with respect to what S recommends to θT. Now, take a
recommendation ˜ z ∈ ˜ Z(˜ φ) such that ξ(θT)=( xr(θB)=xr(θB)=1 ;tr(θB)=tr(θB)=θB). Then,
for any r ∈ ˜ R(˜ z),
Pr(θB|r;ψ)=
ψ(r|θB)Pr(θB)
ψ(r|θB)Pr(θB)+ψ(r|θB)Pr(θB) ≥ ∆θB/[θT − θB].
Since, given ˜ φ, T’s posterior beliefs when she receives the recommendation ˜ z are given by
Pr(θB|˜ z; ˜ φ)=
˜ φ(˜ z|θB)Pr(θB)
˜ φ(˜ z|θB)Pr(θB)+˜ φ(˜ z|θB)Pr(θB) =
P
r∈ ˜ R(˜ z) ψ(r|θB)Pr(θB) P
r∈ ˜ R(˜ z) ψ(r|θB)Pr(θB)+
P
r∈ ˜ R(˜ z) ψ(r|θB)Pr(θB),
then Pr(θB|˜ z; ˜ φ) ≥ ∆θB/[θT − θB], which implies that ˜ z is indeed incentive-compatible. The same
result can be established for any ˜ z ∈ ˜ Z(˜ φ).
We conclude that for any mechanism ψ, there exists a mechanism ˜ φ satisfying (i) and (ii)
that is payoﬀ-equivalent for all players. >From (iii), it is then immediate that in the unrestricted
game, there exists an equilibrium sustaining ˜ φ
∗
. Furthermore, the monopolist’s payoﬀ in such an
equilibrium is necessarily (weakly) higher than in any other equilibrium of the unrestricted game.
Step 2. Now, let r(θB;ξ): =tr(θB)−ξ(1|θB)θB denote the resale surplus that θB obtains when
T oﬀers a direct resale mechanism ξ, and r(θB|˜ z): =pTr(θB;ξ(θT)) + (1 − pT)r(θB;ξ(θT)) the
6For simplicity, we assume R(˜ z) is a ﬁnite set. If not, then let ˜ φ(˜ z|θB)=
R
r∈R(˜ z) dδ(r|θB),w h e r eδ(r|θB) denotes
the probability measure of recommendation r induced by the buyer’s strategy at τ =1 .
5expected surplus given the recommendation ˜ z =( ξ(θT),ξ(θT)).T h em e c h a n i s m˜ φ
∗
satisﬁes (i)-(iii)
if and only if it is a solution to the following program
e PS :
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨








˜ z∈ ˜ Z
˜ φ(˜ z|θB){θB + r(θB|˜ z)} − t(θB) ≥ 0
U(θB) ≥
P
˜ z∈ ˜ Z
˜ φ(˜ z|ˆ θB){θB + r(θB|˜ z)} − t(ˆ θB)
for any ˜ z ∈ ˜ Z(˜ φ) and any θT ∈ ΘT, ξ(θT) satisﬁes SR(˜ z,θT))
˜ φ(˜ z|θB) ≥ 0 with
P
z∈Z
˜ φ(˜ z|θB) ≤ 1 for any θB ∈ ΘB (F)
Step 3. Note that S never gains from using a mechanism ˜ φ that recommends a ξ(θT) in which
xr(θB) ∈ (0,1). Indeed, for any such mechanism, there exists another mechanism ˜ φ
0
in which S
recommends only ξ(θT) such that either xr(θB)=0 , or xr(θB)=1 , which leads to a higher payoﬀ.
It follows that S sends only two possible incentive-compatible recommendations: the ﬁrst one is
for both θT and θT to trade only with θB at a price tr = θB; the second is for θT to trade only
with θB at a price tr = θB and for θT to trade with both types at a price tr = θB. But these are
exactly the same resale outcomes that can be implemented recommending simple take-it-or-leave-it
price oﬀers. It is then immediate that the solution to e PS leads exactly to the same revenue as the
solution to PS in the main text. We conclude that ˜ U∗
S c a na l s ob ea c h i e v e di nt h eg a m ew h e r e
Πr = Υ and Ψ = Φ. Q.E.D.
2 Implementation of the optimal mechanism of Proposition 1 with
price disclosures
Claim A2. When the direct mechanism of Proposition 1 can not be implemented announcing only
the decision to trade, it suﬃces to disclose the price to implement the optimal informational linkage
with the secondary market.
Proof. The implementations in which S discloses the price but keeps the choice of the contract
secret, or discloses the contract with probability less than one, are immediate. In what follows,
we prove that S could also fully disclose the choice of the contract by inducing B to play a mixed
strategy.
Suppose S oﬀers a menu of two price-lottery pairs. The menu is such that B receives the
good with certainty if he pays tH = t∗(θB) and with probability δ =[ 1− J/K]/[1 − J] if he pays
tL = δ [θB + λBs(θB)], where t∗(θB) is the price θB pays in the direct mechanism of Proposition 1.
6We want to show that it is an equilibrium for the high type to pay tH and for the low type to
randomize over tH and tL with probability respectively equal to J and 1 − J. Given this strategy,
θT oﬀers tr = θB when she observes tH and tr = θB when she observes tL, that is tH and tL serve
the same role as ¯ z and z in the direct mechanism. For the low type to be indiﬀerent between tH
and tL it must be that
θB + λBs(θB)+λTpT∆θB − tH = δ [θB + λBs(θB)] − tL. (1)
Since tH = t∗(θB), the left hand side in (1) is also equal to the payoﬀ θB obtains by announcing
θB = θB in the direct mechanism, which is equal to zero since IC(θB) and IR(θB) bind in the
optimal mechanism. As a consequence, tL = δ [θB + λBs(θB)].





− tL. Using the values of δ and tL, the previous equality is equivalent to
θB − tH − [∆θB + λB∆s − λTpT∆θB]=0
which holds true since tH = t∗(θB) and in the optimal mechanism both IR(θB) and IC(θB) are
binding, which implies that 0=θB − tH − [∆θB + λB∆s − λTpT∆θB].
Since this mechanism gives B the same payoﬀ and induces the same distribution over x and Z
as the optimal direct mechanism, it must also give S the same expected revenue. Q.E.D.
3 Resale to third parties with multiple bidders in the primary
market
Claim A3. A monopolist always beneﬁts from the existence of a secondary market when she is
not able to contract with all potential buyers and resale can only be to a third party who does not
participate in the primary market.
Proof. Assume there are N ≥ 2 potential buyers in the primary market. At the end of the
auction, the winner may keep the good for himself or resell it to T in the secondary market, in
which case the bargaining game is exactly as in the single-bidder case with λi denoting the relative
bargaining power of bidder i with respect to T.Continue to assume A1-A4 hold for each bidder and
let θB := (θ1,θ2,...,θN) ∈ ΘB :=
QN
i=1 Θi denote a proﬁle of independent private values. Following
the same steps as for the single bidder case, one can show that, conditional on bidder i winning the
auction, S needs to send only two recommendations: zi must induce θT to oﬀer tr(θT)=θi and ¯ zi




denote the probability the good is assigned to bidder i and a
recommendation zi ∈ {¯ zi,zi} is sent to T when the bidders report θB. Also, let
V (θi|zi): =θi + λisi(θi)
7Vi(θi|zi): =θi −
pi
1−pi∆θi + λi{si(θi) −
pi
1−pi∆si} +( 1− λi){ri(θi|zi) −
pi
1−pi∆ri(zi)}
denote the resale-augmented virtual valuations of bidder i. Following the same steps as for the































Pr(θi|¯ zi) ≥ ∆θi
θT−θi
, (IC(¯ zi))
for i ∈ {1,2,...,N} and θ−i := (θ1,θ2,...,θi−1,θi+1,...,θN).
To prove the claim, we compare the expected revenue associated with the solution to the above
program with the revenue S could achieve in a Myerson optimal auction without resale. Recall that
for any type proﬁle θB, a Myerson auction consists in assigning the good to the bidder with the high-
est virtual valuation, M(θi), provided that maxi {M(θi)} ≥ 0, and in withholding the good other-
wise. The expected revenue of a Myerson optimal auction is thus EθB [max{0,M (θ1),...,M(θN)}],
where M(θi): =θi and M(θi): =θi −
pi
1−pi∆θi,f o re a c hi =1 ,...,N.
The proof is in two steps. The ﬁrst step proves that for any θi ∈ Θi and zi, the resale-
augmented virtual valuations are higher than the corresponding Myerson virtual valuations; that
is, V (θi|zi) ≥ M(θi). This follows directly from the fact that s(θi) ≥ 0,r i(zi) ≥ 0, ∆si ≤ 0 and
∆ri(zi) ≤ 0, for any zi ∈ {¯ zi,zi} and any i.
The second step proves that there exists a recommendation policy that allows to implement
Myerson allocation rule with resale. Conditional on i winning the auction, suppose S sends only
one recommendation zi ∈ {¯ zi,zi}, independently of whether i announces a low or a high type.
The particular recommendation S sends to T depends on the posterior beliefs that are generated
by the Myerson allocation rule; that is, S recommends zi = zi if Pr(θi|i) ≤ ∆θi
θT−θi
, and zi =¯ zi
otherwise, where Pr(θi|i) denotes the probability that θi = θi given that bidder i wins the auction.
Given this policy, which can be trivially implemented disclosing only the identity of the winner,













,c o n s t r a i n t sIC(θi) are also satisﬁed for each i. It
follows that Myerson allocation rule remains implementable also in the presence of resale. It is then





zi∈{¯ zi,zi} V (θi|zi)φ∗ ¡
zi|θB
¢
] ≥ EθB[max{0,M (θ1),...,M(θN)}],
8which proves the result. Q.E.D.
4 Resale to third parties: collusion in the primary market
When S lacks of the commitment not to collude with B, the only credible information that can
be disclosed to the secondary market is the decision to trade. Furthermore, the possibility for S
to make φ public has no strategic eﬀect so that φ must be a best response to the strategy T is
expected to follow in the secondary market. The optimal mechanism can be designed by looking
at the value of the (collusion proof) resale-augmented virtual valuations
V (θB|γ): =θB + λBs(θB),















where γ ∈ [0,p T] is the probability T is expected to oﬀer a high price in the resale game. The
seller’s optimal (collusion-proof) mechanism then maximizes US := EθB [V (θB|γ)φ(θB)] under the
monotonicity condition φ(θB) ≥ φ(θB), where φ(θB) denotes the probability of trade when B
reports θB.
To see how the informational linkage with the secondary market can be fashioned through a
stochastic allocation rule, assume T’s prior beliefs are unfavorable (J<1)a n dV (θB|0) < 0 <
V (θB|pT). In the unique equilibrium, S sells to θB with probability J and to θB with certainty. θT
is then indiﬀerent between oﬀering a high and a low price and randomizes oﬀering tr(θT)=θB with
probability γ∗ ∈ (0,1) and tr(θT)=θB with probability 1 − γ∗,w h e r eγ∗ solves V (θB|pTγ∗)=0
and hence makes S indiﬀerent between selling to the low type and retaining the good.
5 Extended proof of Proposition 2: Optimal auctions with inter-
bidder resale
The reduced program is in the Appendix of the paper (proof of Proposition 2). Here we derive
a complete characterization of the optimal mechanism in the two polar cases where λT =1and
λB =1 .
T has all bargaining power (i.e. λT =1 ).
In this case, S does not need to disclose any information to B. Therefore, we eliminate zB
from the mechanism φ. Furthermore, since θB ≤ θT ≤ θB ≤ θT, when h = T, the only incentive-
compatible recommendation for θT is to ask tr(θT) ≥ θT and for θT to ask tr(θT)=θB if Pr(θB|·) >
0 and any tr ≥ θT otherwise. Similarly, when h = B,the only incentive-compatible recommendation
9for θT is to oﬀer a price tr(θT)=θB if Pr(θB|·) > 0 and any price tr(θT) ≤ θT otherwise. Without
loss, we will assume that θT always asks tr(θT)=θB when h = T and oﬀers tr(θT)=θB when
h = B.7 Since these are the same prices that T oﬀers in the absence of any explicit recommendation,
to save on notation, we will drop zT from the mapping φ when h = T, or h = B and θT = θT.
When instead h = B and θT = θT,w ew i l ld e n o t eb y¯ z and z the recommendations (for θT) to oﬀer
tr(θT)=θB and tr(θT)=θB, respectively. For these recommendations to be incentive compatible,
the mechanism φ must satisfy
φ(B,z|θT,θB) ≥ Jφ(B,z|θT,θB) f IC(z,θT)
φ(B,¯ z|θT,θB) ≤ Jφ(B,¯ z|θT,θB) f IC(¯ z,θT)
where J :=
pB(θT−θB)
(1−pB)∆θB. The maximal revenue for the monopolist can be derived by partitioning the
set of direct mechanisms Φ into two classes. The ﬁrst one, which we denote by Φ1, is such that
θT ﬁnds it (weakly) optimal to oﬀer a high resale price tr(θT)=θB oﬀ-equilibrium, after reporting
ˆ θT = θT. The second is such that θT strictly prefers to oﬀer tr(θT)=θB. For a mechanism φ to
belong to Φ1 it must be that
φ(B|θT,θB) ≤ Jφ(B|θT,θB)( C1)
Letting Iφ∈Φ1 =1if φ ∈ Φ1 and zero otherwise, and substituting for the values of sT(·) and rB(·),
the problem for the monopolist reduces to the choice of a mechanism φ∗ that maximizes8
US = pTpB{θTφ(T|θT,θB)+θTφ(B,¯ z|θT,θB)+θBφ(B,z|θT,θB)}















+[1 − Iφ∈Φ1](M(θT) −
pB
1−pB∆θB)φ(B|θT,θB)}


















[φ(T|θT,θB)+φ(B,¯ z|θT,θB) − φ(T|θT,θB) − Iφ∈Φ1φ(B|θT,θB)]
+(1− pB)∆θT[φ(T|θT,θB)+φ(B,z|θT,θB) − φ(T|θT,θB) − [1 − Iφ∈Φ1]φ(B|θT,θB)]
+(1− pB)(∆θT − ∆θB)[φ(B,¯ z|θT,θB) − Iφ∈Φ1φ(B|θT,θB)] ≥ 0.
(f IC(θT))
7Clearly, S h a sn oi n c e n t i v et or e c o m m e n dad i ﬀerent price.
8Assuming that ¯ θT oﬀers a high price oﬀ-equilibrium when she is indiﬀerent between t
r = ¯ θB and t
r = θB is
without loss of generality. Indeed, when φ(B|θT,θ B)=Jφ(B|θT,¯ θB), the program for the optimal mechanism is the
same no matter whether ¯ θT oﬀe r sal o wo rah i g hr e s a l ep r i c e .













, θ =(θT,θB) only through the
constraints f IC(θT) and f IC(θB). In what follows, we disregard f IC(θT) since it never binds at the
optimum. Also note that it is always optimal to set φ∗ (T|θ)=1for θ =( θT,θB) and θ =( θT,θB).
Indeed, this maximizes US and it helps relaxing f IC(θB).9
To derive the optimal mechanism, it thus suﬃces to consider the monopolist’s payoﬀ in the
other two sates θ =( θT,θB) and θ =( θT,θB).
• Consider ﬁrst J ≥ 1.
1. Suppose φ∗ / ∈ Φ1.T h e nS could reduce φ(B|θT,θB) and increase φ(T|θT,θB) enhancing
her payoﬀ. The optimal mechanism thus necessarily belongs to Φ1.






≥ 0, φ∗ ¡
B|θT,θB
¢
=1is clearly optimal. In this case








∆θB ≥ max{0; M(θT)},



























then S retains the good when θ =( θT,θB) and the revenue is US = pT (1 − pB)θT +
pBθB.10


















0,Snever sells to T when the latter reports a low valuation, i.e. when θ =( θT,θB) or
























9Note that φ(T|θ)=1is payoﬀ equivalent to φ(B,z|θ)=1for θ =(θT,θB), and θ =(θT,θ B). Nevertheless, selling
to T in these two states is more eﬀective in relaxing f IC(θT) than selling to B. This also implies that when f IC(θT)
does not bind, the optimal allocation rule need not be unique.
10Again, the solution may not be unique, as φ(T|θ)=1is payoﬀ equivalent to φ(B|θ)=1for θ =(θT,θB). For
















11and φ∗ (B|θT,θB)=φ∗ (B|θT,θB)=0otherwise. In the ﬁrst case, the revenue is
US =( 1− pB)θT + pT∆θB + pBθB, whereas in the second US = pTθT.
• Suppose now J<1.
1. In this case f IC(θB) can be neglected as it never binds at the optimum. Furthermore, the
optimal mechanism necessarily belongs to Φ1. The argument is the same as for J ≥ 1.














∆θB ≥ max{0,M (θT)}
then (C1) binds and thus φ∗ (B|θT,θB)=J. If in addition M(θT) ≥ 0, then φ∗ (T|θT,θB)=




θT(pT − pB)+( 1− pT)θB
¤
+θT(1−pB), whereas in the latter (1−pB)θT+pT∆θB+








∆θB < max{0,M (θT)},
then necessarily φ∗ (B|θT,θB)=0 .A sf o rφ(T|θT,θB), at the optimum φ∗ (T|θT,θB)=
1 when M(θT) ≥ 0, whereas φ∗ (T|θT,θB)=0when M(θT) < 0.T h er e v e n u ei se q u a l
to (1 − pB)θT + pBθB in the ﬁrst case and (1 − pB)θT + pT∆θB + pBθB in the second.






< 0. At the optimum, (C1) necessarily binds. It
follows that φ∗ ¡
B|θT,θB
¢
























= φ∗ (B|θT,θB)=0when (2) is reversed . In either case, S never
sells to T when the latter reports a low valuation, that is, φ∗(T|θ)=0when θ =( θT,θB)
and θ =( θT,θB). The revenue is












in the former case, and pTθT in the latter.
B has all bargaining power (i.e. λB =1 ).
In this case, S does not need to disclose any information to T. Therefore, we eliminate zT
from the mechanism φ. Furthermore, since θB ≤ θT ≤ θB ≤ θT, when h = T, the only incentive-
compatible recommendation is for θB to oﬀer tr(θB) ≤ θB and for θB to oﬀer tr(θB)=θT if
Pr(θT|·) > 0 and any tr ≤ θB otherwise. Similarly, when h = B, the only incentive-compatible
12recommendation for θB is to ask a price tr(θB)=θT if Pr(θT|·) > 0 and any price tr ≥ θB otherwise.
Without loss of generality, we will assume that θB always asks tr(θB)=θT when h = B and oﬀers
tr(θB)=θT when h = T.Since these are the same prices that B oﬀers in the absence of any explicit
recommendation, to save on notation, we will drop zB from the mapping φ when h = T, or h = B
and θB = θB. When instead h = B and θB = θB,w ew i l ld e n o t eb y¯ z and z the recommendations
(for θB)t oa s ktr(θB)=θT and tr(θB)=θT, respectively. For these recommendations to be
incentive compatible, the mechanism φ must satisfy
φ(B,z|θT,θB) ≥ Qφ(B,z|θT,θB) f IC(z,θB)
φ(B,¯ z|θT,θB) ≤ Qφ(B,¯ z|θT,θB) f IC(¯ z,θB)
where Q :=
pT∆θT
(1−pT)(θT−θB). Let Φ1 denote the set of mechanisms such that θB ﬁnds it (weakly) op-
timal to ask a high resale price tr(θB)=θT oﬀ-equilibrium, after reporting ˆ θB = θB.Am e c h a n i s m
φ ∈ Φ1 only if
φ(B|θT,θB) ≤ Qφ(B|θT,θB)( C1)
Letting Iφ∈Φ1 =1if φ ∈ Φ1 and zero otherwise, and substituting for the values of sT(·) and rB(·),


























































































− φ(B,z|θT,θB)] ≥ 0.
(f IC(θB))
11Assuming that θB a s k sah i g hp r i c eo ﬀ-equilibrium when she is indiﬀerent between t
r = ¯ θT and t
r = θT is without
loss of generality. Indeed, when φ(B|θT,θB)=Qφ(B|θT,θB), the program for the optimal mechanism is the same
no matter whether θB asks a low or a high resale price.









1−pB(θB−θT) ≤ M(θB), then Q ≥ 1. In this case the mechanism φ∗(B|θ)=1
for θ =( θT,θB) and θ =( θT,θB), and φ∗(B,¯ z|θ)=1for θ =( θT,θB) and θ =( θT,θB)
maximizes US and satisﬁes all constraints. For any θB, B always asks tr(θB)=θT
and thus trade occurs in the secondary market if and only if T has a high valuation.
In this case, the ﬁnal allocation and the expected revenue coincide with that in the
Myerson optimal auction if M(θT) ≤ M(θB). If, on the contrary, M(θT) >M(θB), then
in state θ =( θT,θB), B retains the good, contrary to what prescribed by the Myerson
allocation rule. This in turn induces a loss of expected revenue equal to (1 − pT)(1 −
pB)[M(θT) − M(θB)].
2. If M(θT) −
pB
1−pB(θB − θT) >M(θB), the following mechanism φ∗ / ∈ Φ1 maximizes US
and satisﬁes all constraints
φ∗(T|θT,θB)=φ∗(T|θT,θB)=φ∗(T|θT,θB)=φ∗(B|θT,θB)=1 .
Trade does not occur in the secondary market, the ﬁn a la l l o c a t i o ni se x a c t l ya si n
Myerson, but the expected revenue is just pTpBθT +( 1− pTpB)θT instead of
Eθ [max{0,M (θT),M (θB)}]=pB[pTθT +( 1− pT)θB]+( 1− pB)θT.






< 0.I nt h i sc a s e ,S ﬁnds it optimal to
retain the good when θ =( θT,θB). As for the other states, the following mechanism maximizes
US and satisﬁes all constraints
φ∗(T|θT,θB)=φ∗(T|θT,θB)=φ∗(B|θT,θB)=1 .
The monopolist’s expected revenue is pTθT +( 1− pT)pBθB, trade occurs in the primary
market if and only if at least one of the two bidders has a high valuation, and no oﬀers are made
in the resale game. If M(θT) ≤ 0, the expected revenue is the same as in the Myerson auction.
On the contrary, if M(θT) > 0 >M(θB),Sincurs a loss equal to (1 − pT)(1− pB)M(θT).
We conclude that when λB =1 , the impossibility to prohibit resale results in a loss of expected
revenue for the monopolist if and only if M(θT) > max{0,M(θB)}.
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